Tokenomics and Emissions

The emission schedule of hardware nodes, including DogeBox and future hardware products designed by Cysic, sets a hard cap of 13.39% (or around 133.9 million CYS tokens) on the total CYS allocated to hardware node operators, with rewards unlocked progressively as more devices come online and actively participate. Rather than distributing a fixed amount upfront, emissions are released according to an on-chain schedule tied to verified participation, so the program scales with real network contribution and avoids centralized allocation. In the initial rollout, the schedule is designed around a time-bounded activation window (e.g., per-device daily rewards over defined campaign periods), where total emissions are mechanically determined by the number of active hardware nodes in each epoch, and automatically throttle if participation grows beyond the intended budget.

Understanding the Emission Schedule

The emission schedule for hardware nodes—including Dogebox and future hardware products designed by Cysic—sets a clear, auditable framework that rewards early operators while preserving long-term sustainability. A hard cap limits total distribution to 13.39% of the CYS supply (around 133.9 million CYS) allocated to hardware node operators, preventing open-ended inflation. Within that cap, the schedule is structured to remain attractive for early adopters, then normalize over time as the network matures and participation becomes increasingly self-sustaining.

Rather than distributing a fixed amount upfront, hardware node rewards are unlocked progressively as more devices come online and actively participate. Emissions follow an on-chain schedule tied to verified participation, ensuring rewards scale with real contribution instead of discretionary approvals. As hardware node participation grows, more emissions can be released according to the schedule, while remaining bounded by the overall allocation and enforceable caps.

The Emission Schedule

The 13.39% CYS token supply is distributed gradually over 10 years. For instance, the distribution for the first 5 years is roughly like the following:

Year 1: 30% of the total hardware node allocation (4.01% of the total CYS supply)
Year 2: 20% of the total hardware node allocation (2.67% of the total CYS supply)
Year 3: 15% of the total hardware node allocation (2.0% of the total CYS supply)
Year 4: 10% of the total hardware node allocation (1.34% of the total CYS supply)
Year 5: 7% of the total hardware node allocation (0.94% of the total CYS supply)

The emission schedule is not solely time-based; it also adapts to the number of active hardware nodes in each epoch. In the initial rollout, incentives are organized around time-bounded activation windows, for example, per-device daily rewards over defined campaign periods, where total emissions are mechanically determined by how many hardware nodes are active and contributing during that epoch. If participation expands faster than expected, payouts can automatically throttle through per-epoch caps and proportional settlement, keeping the system predictable and sustainable without centralized allocation.

Over time, this structure enables a smooth transition from an early growth phase—optimized for onboarding and rapid decentralization, into a more balanced, scalable model where incentives remain aligned with verified participation and long-term ecosystem health.

The Rewarding Rule

This section specifies a deterministic, participation-weighted reward mechanism for hardware nodes. The mechanism converts measurable contributions, baseline mining output and incremental network services, into a unified Computing Score (CS). Epoch rewards are then distributed pro-rata by score, ensuring that rewards track real contribution while remaining fully budget-bounded and non-discretionary.

Each epoch, every eligible hardware node i is assigned a Computing Score CS_i .The protocol defines an epoch reward budget E, which is derived from the annual hardware-node emission schedule. In addition to time-based issuance, the annual schedule incorporates a participation-based unlock mechanism: a portion of the yearly hardware-node rewards is released only when the network reaches sufficient active participation, ensuring emissions scale with real adoption rather than being distributed upfront. Concretely, the yearly "growth" allocation G_yto an unlock rate, defined as:

$$ \mathsf{unlockRate}_y = \min(1, \frac{A_y \cdot r_y}{G_y}), \quad \mathsf{GrowthEmitted}_y = G_y \cdot \mathsf{unlockRate}_y $$

where A_y is the average number of active hardware nodes in a certain time period (initially set as biweekly), and r_y is a protocol-defined “reward-per-active-node” parameter. The resulting yearly emissions are then converted into epoch budgets E (e.g., by dividing by the number of epochs), and distributed mechanically via Computing Scores. Node i's reward for the epoch is computed as:

\mathsf{Reward} = E\times \frac{\mathsf{CS}_i}{\sum_{j} \mathsf{CS}_j}

This construction guarantees that total distribution for the epoch is exactly E, regardless of the number of participants, while naturally allocating larger shares to nodes with higher verified contribution.

The Computing Score is defined as:

$$ \mathsf{CS}=f(Q\cdot D + Z)\cdot R $$

where

D: the node’s uptime measurement, calculated as the DOGE mined per day. It represents a node’s baseline “always-on” contribution, derived from its measured mining output.
Z: additional verifiable work performed for the network during the scoring window (e.g., state-root validation attestations, governance vote participation, ZK verification, and other approved edge tasks). It captures incremental services that strengthen the network beyond baseline mining economics
Q: a quarterly decay factor that discounts baseline contribution over time to prioritize early participation and prevent static advantage from legacy activity. It is represented as a fixed-point multiplier updated by elapsed quarters. The decay parameters are defined by protocol governance and applied algorithmically, ensuring consistent scoring across nodes.
R: a multiplier capturing node quality and alignment (e.g., reliability tier, stake alignment, or other objective criteria), computed mechanically from verifiable signals. The multiplier can be used to implement tier systems and long-term alignment incentives without changing the core pro-rata distribution logic.
f: to balance fairness and sustainability, the mechanism applies a concave-but-increasing nonlinear function:

f(n) = n\cdot \log(n+1)

We would like to emphasize that DOGE mined per day is used as a practical proxy for node uptime. Because a node can only mine when it is powered on, connected, and operational, sustained mining output provides a high-signal indicator that the hardware node has remained online throughout the epoch. Importantly, the mined DOGE is not merely a scoring input: it is intended to offset or fully cover the node’s electricity costs, allowing operators to keep their hardware running continuously without paying out-of-pocket operating bills. This design aligns incentives with real-world sustainability, nodes that are reliably online are both economically self-sustaining and more valuable to the network.

Security and Anti-Manipulation Considerations

To preserve integrity:

D must be derived from verifiable mining evidence (e.g., signed pool receipts, challengeable claims, or proofs of shares).
Z must be based on tasks with objective verification rules to prevent “free work” inflation.
R must be mechanically computed (tier thresholds, uptime attestations, stake locks) without centralized approval.

By anchoring rewards to verifiable inputs and distributing them through a fixed-budget pro-rata mechanism, the Computing Score system provides a transparent and scalable foundation for incentivizing hardware-node participation over the network’s full lifecycle. To further strengthen security, the protocol may require hardware-node operators to reserve (lock) a minimum amount of CYS, scaling with higher tiers, to increase Sybil resistance, deter malicious behavior through economic cost, and enable slashing or penalty mechanisms where applicable.